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Introduction
Until satellite x-ray technology takes the mystery out of hydrocarbon
exploration, seismic surveys will continue to provide the best guide to
exploratory drilling locations. Some seismic surveys are done for a specific
customer or group of customers on a contract basis, usually covering areas
licensed by, or adjacent to areas licensed by that customer or group of
customers; other surveys are done by geophysical service providers who
hope to market the resulting data to interested explorers.
Many governments recognize the value of seismic information as a
facilitator of exploration activity and require, as a consequence, that: (a)
seismic information must be submitted to government as a condition to the
regulatory permission to conduct the survey; and (b) seismic information
may be disclosed to third parties after certain hold periods have expired.
In this paper we review some of the public and private issues of
confidentiality of seismic data. The first part of the paper will examine
the two main legal mechanisms used to protect confidential seismic data
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from improper disclosure or use: contractual provisions and the common
law duty of confidence. It will also briefly address the concept of breach
of fiduciary duty and its declining importance in addressing misuse of
confidential information. The second part of this paper will examine the
statutory regimes governing the.Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador and
the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Boards and other authorities
regulating the exploration for oil and gas and other minerals, particularly
in light of copyright and access to information and protection of privacy
legislation. Our goal is to determine the balance between the private rights
of the producers/owners of seismic data and the public responsibility to
encourage the development of Canada's natural resources.
I. Background
The word seismic is derived from the Greek "seismos" meaning "shock."
Traditionally, the word seismic was associated with earthquakes and other
natural movements of the earth's crust. However, since the discovery that
low frequency sound waves can be used to explore subsurface geology in
order to identify areas of potential hydrocarbon presence, the word has
also come to be associated with this exploration technique.
In A Dictionaryfor the Petroleum Industry,' "seismic data" is defined
as "detailed information obtained from earth vibration produced naturally
or artificially."'2 A more helpful definition is that of "seismic survey":
An exploration method in which strong low-frequency sound waves are
generated on the surface or in the water to find subsurface rock structures
that may contain hydrocarbons. The sound waves travel through the
layers of the earth's crust; however, at formation boundaries some of
the waves are reflected back to the surface where sensitive detectors
pick them up. Reflections from shallow formations arrive at the surface
sooner than reflections from deep formations, and since the reflections
are recorded, a record of the depth and configuration of the various
formations can be generated. Interpretation of the record can reveal
possible hydrocarbon-bearing formations.3
As noted above, the primary use of seismic data by oil and gas exploration
companies has been to assist in searching for hydrocarbons. This paper
refers to seismic data throughout; however, most comments would apply
equally to other types of geophysical data as well.

1. The University of Texas at Austin, A Dictionaryfor the Petroleum Industry, 3d ed. (Austin:
Petroleum Extension Service, 1999).
2. Ibid.s.v. "seismic data."
3.
Ibid.s.v. "seismic survey."
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Generally speaking, there are two important bundles of rights that one
may have in seismic data. 4 The first is a proprietary interest, or "ownership"
of the seismic data. Where the data is owned by one party, it is sometimes
referred to as "100% proprietary" data. Where the data is jointly owned by
more than one party, it is sometimes referred to as "partnered proprietary"
data. Where one or more people have a proprietary interest in seismic data,
they "own" the data and may, subject to any agreement between them, do
with it as they wish. They may, for example, sell, license, or otherwise
disclose the data as they see fit.
The second type of interest one may have in seismic data is -a licence
to use it for certain purposes. A licence may be granted by the owners
of the data to one or' more parties who wish to use the data. The licensor
of the data in such a situation is often a geophysical company formed to
acquire proprietary seismic data with a view to licensing it to multiple
parties. The protection of the confidentiality of licensed seismic data is
of critical importance to geophysical companies because any sharing of
the data between a licensed user and a potential licensee may remove a
potential client from what may be a very small group of parties interested
in such data.
In both circumstances, the parties with an interest in the data (whether
as owner or licensee) will wish to keep the information confidential to
protect its value. However, there may be circumstances when disclosure
of seismic data is desirable for business reasons. For example, a company
that is a licensor of seismic data will have to disclose the data in order to
license it to potential licensees. For proprietary data, the owner or owners
may wish to disclose the data to potential financiers, tojoint venturers, or, in
the context of a sale or acquisition, to promote a contemplated transaction.
Whenever seismic data is shared, concerns arise that it may be disclosed
or used for purposes other than those intended by the party disclosing the
information. In the case of the licensing of seismic data, this may decrease
the number of potential licensees and thus the economic value of the data.
For others, such unintended disclosure or use may deprive the owner of
a valuable business opportunity by giving a competitor information that
may be used to the detriment of the party disclosing the data.
Thus, owners and licensees of seismic data will generally have a keen
interest in ensuring that where confidential seismic data-is to be disclosed
to third parties, appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure that the data
is not improperly disclosed. or used by the party receiving the data.
4.
There are undoubtedly other sorts of rights that one may have in seismic data, but for the purposes
of this paper it is sufficient to focus on these two.
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II. Analysis
1. Contract
Where confidential seismic data is to be provided by one party to another,
the party providing the data (the confider) and the party receiving the
data (the confidee) will typically enter into an agreement setting out the
terms and conditions upon which the confider will provide the data to
the confidee. Such an agreement may restrict, expand, or entirely exclude
any duty of confidentiality that would exist at common law.' In Cadbury
Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.,6 Binnie J. stated:
Just as contractual terms can limit or negative a more general duty implied
by the law of tort, so too can a contractual term that deals expressly or by
necessary implication with confidentiality negate the general obligation
otherwise imposed by equity ... The ability of parties to contract out
of, or limit, general duties otherwise imposed by law has been labeled
"private ordering", and the general principles applicable here [where
there is both a contract and a duty of confidentiality] would be analogous
to the principles considered by this court in the context of concurrent
remedies in tort and contract ... 7
Similarly, in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. InternationalCorona Resources Ltd.,8
in considering the effect of evidence as to industry practice, La Forest
J. indicated that the courts should take great care in reading terms into
the bargain between the parties by suggesting "[w]hen the parties have
reduced their understandings to writing, it is obviously the proper course
for courts to be extremely circumspect in adding to the bargain they have
set down." 9

Express confidentiality provisions will not always entirely exclude
the common law duty of confidentiality, and in some circumstances there
may be both contractual and common law confidentiality obligations.
In Visagie v. TVX Gold Inc.,1° the confidee was found to have breached
both the terms of a confidentiality agreement and its common law duty of
confidentiality when it used confidential information to bid successfully
on a mining property to the exclusion of the confider who had provided
the information in the context of discussions about entering a joint venture
5.
See ERSS Equity Retirement Savings Systems Corp. v. CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce,
2002 BCSC 1462, (2002), 8 B.C.L.R. (4th) 340 at paras. 15-16 [ERSSEquity]. The common law duty
of confidentiality is discussed more fully in Part 11.2 of this paper.
6.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 [CadburySchweppes].
7.
Ibid. at para. 36.
8.
[1989] 2 S.C.R 574 [Lac Minerals].
9.
Ibid. at para. 168.
10. (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 198 (C.A.) [ isagiel.
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arrangement to bid for the same property." If the intent of the parties is
for the contractual provisions to supplant entirely the common law duty
of confidentiality, this intention should be expressed very clearly in the
agreement.
Confidentiality agreements concerning the provision of seismic data
will typically address several important concepts. These include:
1. a definition of the confidential information subject to the
agreement;
2. an obligation on the confidee to not disclose or use the
confidential information except as otherwise permitted; and
3. what is permitted to be done with the confidential
information. 2
There are, of course, numerous other provisions that may be included in
such an agreement, many of which will be no different than one would
expect to see in a typical commercial agreement. The purpose of this
section of the paper is not to exhaustively set out and examine all the
clauses that are typically found in a confidentiality agreement, but rather
to briefly identify a few of the more interesting clauses that may appear in
confidentiality agreements concerning seismic data.
a. Definition of confidential information
A balancing of competing interests must be undertaken in defining what
the confidential information subject to the agreement will be. Generally,
information that is or becomes publicly available, or that the confidee
becomes aware of independently, without a breach of any obligation
to the confider by the confidee or any other person, is excluded from
the definition. In some cases, the definition is drafted very broadly to
include all information provided to the confidee that is not in the public
domain. Such a broad definition may cause difficulties for the confidee
by restricting what it can do with information that subsequently becomes
public or otherwise comes to its attention through proper means. Such a

11. See also Minera Aquiline Argentina SA v. IMA ExplorationInc., 2006 BCSC 1102, (2006), 58
B.C.L.R. (4th) 217 [Minera Aquiline] where the Court also found both a breach of a confidentiality
agreement and the common law duty of confidentiality.
12. For a more in-depth examination of typical provisions in confidentiality agreements in the
context of the oil and gas industry, see Mungo Hardwicke-Brown, "Confidentiality and Dispositions
in the Oil and Gas Industry" (1997) 35 Alta L. Rev. 356; Kevin Plowman, Doris Reimer & Wayne
Fedun, "Good Faith and Fiduciary Obligations in the Handling of Confidential Seismic Data" (Paper
presented to New Developments: Seismic Data and Technologies Conference, March 2002).
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broadly worded clause may cause the confidee not to be able to make use of
information that every other person who has not signed the confidentiality
agreement may use. In other circumstances, the defmition is far narrower
and is limited by referring to information provided by the confider to the
confidee concerning a certain area or project. Such a narrow definition
may cause difficulties for the confider if there is a chance that confidential
information about other projects or areas may be disclosed in the course
of discussions between the confider and the confidee. A court may find
that the confidentiality agreement did not restrict the use of such "other"
information. This would be particularly problematic if the agreement
was also drafted so as to exclude entirely the common law obligation of
confidentiality as between the parties without reference to the defimition of
confidential information. 3
b. Obligationto not disclose or use confidential information
There will often be a general prohibition on the use or disclosure of
the confidential information, except as expressly permitted by the
confidentiality agreement. This may take the form of a blanket prohibition
on the use of the information except for the purpose of determining whether
or not to enter into the contemplated transaction.
In addition, there are sometimes additional express restrictions placed
on the confidee. One of the more common, and troublesome, clauses
for confidees is the "area of exclusion clause." While the terms of such
a clause will vary, the essential purpose is to define an area around the
property or properties that are the subject of the contemplated transaction
in which the confidee will be prohibited from acquiring any interest for a
period of time without the consent of the confider. Such clauses should
be examined carefully in light of the particular transaction, as they may
have unintended consequences for both the confider and the confidee. 14 In
particular, the confidee should take care to determine whether the area of
exclusion clause would restrict it from an area in which it is legitimately
interested regardless of the data to be shared pursuant to the agreement.

13. Several recent cases deal with issues concerning the scope of the definition of what constitutes
confidential information under a confidentiality agreement: ERSS Equity, supra note 5; Minera
Aquiline, supra note 11; and, in particular, with respect to issues about what information is or becomes
public, Vsagie, supranote 10.
14. Several recent cases have interpreted the area of exclusion clauses. The differing results in
these cases are illustrative of the importance of the careful drafting of these clauses. See Novawest
Resources Inc. v. Anglo American Exploration (Canada)Ltd., 2006 BCSC 769, [2006] B.C.W.L.D.
5130 and MineraAquiline, supra note 1I.
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c. Permitteduses of confidential information
A confidentiality agreement will often expressly permit, as an exception
to the covenant not to disclose or use the confidential information, certain
uses that would otherwise be a breach of the agreement. For example, the
confidee may be permitted to share the information with its third party
experts, or its financiers, so long as appropriate confidentiality measures
are implemented.
There may also be express provisions setting out in detail how the
confidential information may be examined and handled. Such provisions
may permit the confidee to use the confider's or the confidee's computer
programs; it may address the provision of raw or interpreted data; it may
permit the making of copies, notes, drawings, etc.; or it may permit only
viewing of the raw data.
Thus, contractual arrangements are often used to set out particular terms
for the protection of confidential seismic data that is to be shared among
the parties to the contract. These arrangements may restrict, expand or
even entirely eliminate the confidentiality obligations that would exist at
common law. In the next section, this common law duty of confidentiality
will be examined in detail.
2. Breach of confidence
Canadian courts have come to recognize a common law duty to protect
confidences in certain circumstances, and a concomitant cause of action
for the breach of such duty. The elements of the cause of action for breach
of confidence were articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lac
Minerals, where La Forest J. stated:
The test for whether there has been a breach of confidence is not seriously
disputed by the parties. It consists in establishing three elements: that
the information conveyed was confidential, that it was communicated
in confidence, and
that it was misused by the party to whom it was
15
communicated.
*This duty is not dependent upon doctrines of property, contract, or equity,
and has been described by the Supreme Court of Canada as sui generis,
with roots in both equity and the common law. In his dissenting opinion
in Lac Minerals, Sopinka J. stated:
The foundation of action for breach of confidence does not rest solely on
one of the traditional jurisdictional bases for action of contract, equity
or property. The action is sui generis relying on all three to enforce the
policy of the law that confidences be respected ... This multi-faceted
15.

Supra note 8 at para. 129.
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jurisdictional basis for the action provides the Court with considerable
flexibility in fashioning a remedy. The jurisdictional basis supporting the
particular claim is relevant in determining the appropriate remedy. 6
The majority in Lac Minerals did not appear to disagree with Sopinka
J. with respect to this statement, which was later taken up, with apparent
approval, by Binnie J. in Cadbury Schweppes. He confirmed that the sui
generis concept was adopted to recognize the flexibility that the courts
had applied in the past in order to uphold confidentiality and to craft a
remedy appropriate to the circumstances, without being constrained by the
17
doctrinal principles of property, contract, or equity.
The following is a brief overview of the content of each of the three
elements of the test for breach of confidence.
a.

Confidentialinformation

The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that there is a relatively low
threshold in respect of what kinds of information may be the subject of a
breach of confidence. In Cadbury Schweppes, Binnie J. stated:
Equity has set a relatively low threshold on what kinds of information are
capable of constituting the subject matter of a breach of confidence. In
Coco v. A.N. Clark(Engineers)Ltd., supra,Megarry J., ... considered that

"some product of the human brain" applied to existing knowledge might
suffice. A similarly expansive concept was adopted in [Lac Minerals]
...
by Sopinka J., ... Gurry in Breach of Confidence, gives instances of

information which were protected from disclosure because they were
otherwise inaccessible, despite the fact that they possessed little or no
actual value ...
18

The question of whether information has the required nature of confidentiality will be dependent upon the facts of the particular case.
Information that is in the public domain will rarely be considered to
be confidential. However, where such information is subsequently
manipulated, processed, analyzed, or interpreted to create new information,
the new information may be considered confidential, even though the
underlying information is not. 9
In PharandSki Corp. v. Alberta,2 Mason J. set out a non-exclusive list
of factors to consider in determining whether information is confidential:

16. Ibid. at paras. 73-74.
17. Supra note 6 at para. 28.
18. Ibid. at para. 75.
19. Supra note 10 at para. 45; Ridgewood Resources Ltd. v. Henuset, [1982] A.J. No. 641 (C.A.)
(QL) at para. 26 [Ridgewood].
20. (1991), 80Alta. L.R. (2d) 216 (Q.B.) [Pharand].
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1) The extent to which the information is known outside the owner's
business;
2) The extent to which it is known by employees'and others involved
in the owner's business;
3) The extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information;
4) The value of the information to him and his competitors;
5) The amount of money or effort expended by him in developing the
information;
6) The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or 2 duplicated by others [i.e., by their independent
endeavours]. '
it is submitted that in most circumstances, seismic data (whether raw,
processed, or reprocessed) will be considered to be confidential if it has
not been widely shared outside the seismic producer's business without
appropriate safeguards (i.e., confidentiality arrangements), and appropriate
steps have been taken to keep it confidential. In most circumstances, it
will be clear that it is valuable to keep the data secret because significant
amounts of money and effort were expended in acquiring the data. Seismic
data may not be found to be confidential where it has been widely shared
without appropriate safeguards, or where it has been publicly disclosed
pursuant to law (and any applicable confidentiality period has expired).
b. Communicated in confidence
This element of the test requires that the plaintiff prove that the information
was communicated in a confidential manner such that the confidee knew, or
ought reasonably to have known, that it was being disclosed in confidence.
When information of a commercial nature is communicated in a business
context, the confidee carries a heavy burden if he or she wishes to deny
22
that there is an obligation of confidence.
An oft-cited articulation of the requirements of this element of the test
is Megarry J.'s decision in Coco v. A.N Clark (Engineers)Ltd., 3 where
he stated:
It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable

21. Ibid. at 246.
22. Julie A. Thorburn & Keith G. Fairbairn, Law of Confidential Business Information (Aurora:
Canada Law Book, 2006) at 5-7.
23. [1968] F.S.R. 415, [1969] R.P.C. 41 [Coco].
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man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have
realized that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given
to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the
equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, where information of
commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with
some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture or the
manufacture of articles by one party for the other, I would regard the
recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that
he was bound by an obligation of confidence ...21
The courts have made it clear that a duty of confidence and an action.
for the breach of such duty may lie even where the party alleged to have
committed the breach is a stranger to the confider, and there has been no
communication directly between them. In Cadbury Schweppes, Binnie J.
stated:
Equity, as a court of conscience, directs itself to the behaviour of the
person who has come into possession of information that is in fact
confidential, and was accepted on that basis, either expressly or by
implication. Equity will pursue the information into the hands of a third
party who receives it with the knowledge that it was communicated in
breach of confidence (or afterwards acquires notice of that fact even if
innocent at the time of acquisition) and impose its remedies.25
Similarly, in Murphy Oil Co. v. PredatorCorp.,26 Nation J. stated:
The law may and has extended an obligation of confidence to the receipt
of information in the knowledge that it was confidential. In these
situations, where there is not a direct relationship between the parties, and
confidentiality does not arise out of contractual terms, equity examines
the circumstances of the disclosure to determine if the defendants'
27
conscience is bound to keep the information confidential.
Nation J. continued:
Once a confidence has been broken, equitable jurisdiction may lie
against third parties who receive that confidential information. If a third
party has actual knowledge that he is receiving information in breach of
confidence at the time when the information is communicated to him, he
will be affixed with an obligation of confidence at the time he receives
the information... Professor Gurry states:
A third party who acquires confidential information with

24.
25.
26.
27.

Ibid. at 47.
Supra note 6 at para. 19.
2006 ABQB 680, (2007), 67 Alta. L.R. (4th) 325 [Murphy].
Ibid.atpara.61.
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knowledge, whether actual, imputed, or constructive, that
the acquisition is facilitated by a breach of confidence,
will therefore, be liable from the date of acquisition. Any
unauthorized use of the information will render him liable to
account for profits derived from that use, and further use will
be restrained, in appropriate circumstances, by injunction.2"

c. Misuse [to the detriment of the confider]
In Lac Minerals,the third element of the test was described by La Forest
J. as follows:
In establishing a breach of a duty of confidence, the relevant question to
be asked is, "what is the confidee entitled to do with the information?"
and not, "to what use he is prohibited from putting it?" Any use other
than a permitted use is prohibited and amounts to a breach of duty.
When information is provided in confidence, the obligation is on the
confidee to show that the -use to which he put the information is not a

prohibited.use ...
This excerpt suggests a relatively low threshold in that any use, except

for one that is expressly. permitted, will amount to a misuse sufficient to
sustain a claim of breach of confidence. Thus, the receipt of confidential
information in circumstances of confidence establishes a positive duty
on the confidee not to use that information for any purpose other than for
which the information was conveyed. Any use outside of these purposes
may be considered a misuse.
It should be noted that there appears to be an open question, at least
in Canadian law, as to whether or not the misuse of the confidential
information must result in detriment to the confider. In Lac Minerals,
La Forest J. did not explicitly include the requirement of detriment when
he articulated the test.3 0 However, in the same paragraph, he quoted the
decision of Megarry J. in Coco, which stated that the third element of
the test was "unauthorized use of that information to the detriment of the
party communicating it."'" Sopinka J., on the other hand, did not articulate
his view of the elements of the cause of action for breach of confidence.
He simply set out, in a summary way, how the lower courts addressed
the elements of the test. He indicated that the question in the lower
courts was: "Did Lac by acquiring the Williams property to the exclusion

28.
29.
30.
31.

Ibid. at para. 62.
Supra note 8 at para. 139.
Ibid. at para. 129.
Ibid.
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of Corona misuse or make an unauthorized use of the information? ''32
This was under the heading for the third element of the test "Misuse of
Information." However, Sopinka J. noted that the trial judge had found
33
that Lac had made use of the information to the detriment of Corona.
These differences have led the Canadian case law and commentary to
develop such that it is uncertain whether or not it must be proven that the
confider suffered detriment when the confidee misuses the confidential
information. In CadburySchweppes, the Supreme Court of Canada noted
this issue, but was not required to address it because the parties had agreed
prior to trial that evidence concerning losses would be deferred to a posttrial reference. In Alberta, there have been conflicting cases considering
whether or not detriment is a required element to make out the cause of
34
action. In Pharand,it appears that proof of detriment was not required.
On the other hand, in Ridgewood, it appears that detriment was considered
to be a required element.35 In Murphy, Nation J. stated:
There have been divergent views expressed in the law as to whether
detriment must be proven as a necessary element to establish a breach of
confidence. Initial statements of the law, and the three part test, generally
expressed the third element of unauthorized use of the confidential
information to the detriment of the plaintiff.3"
Nation J. proceeded to survey the case law and then continued:
The discussion about detriment may be somewhat academic, because
in cases in which it cannot be shown, it will usually be unlikely that an
action will be pursued ...In the context of the discussion about detriment,
especially as it relates to remedy, courts have been clear that inferences
may have to be drawn from the evidence as to what would likely have
happened "but for" the breach.37
Nation J. avoided making a conclusive statement on the requirement
for detriment to be proven and determined that in any event, if proof of
detriment was required, there had been such detriment in that case.
Thus, it would appear to still be an open question as to whether or
not detriment must be proven in order to make out the cause of action for
breach of confidence. However, in light of Sopinka J.'s silence on the
requirement, and La Forest J.'s reference to the test as set out by Megarry J.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid. at para. 54.
Ibid. at para. 65.
Supra note 20 at 18.
Supra note 19 at paras. 20 & 24.
Supra note 26 at para. 106.
Ibid. atparas. 109-110.
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in Coco (which included detriment as a requirement), the best view would
appear to be that detriment must be proven in order to make out a breach
of confidence. However, as Nation J. made clear in Murphy, inferences
may have to be drawn from the evidence as to what would likely have
happened "but for" the breach.
d. Remedies
In Lac Minerals,the majority of the Supreme Court found that but for the
breach of confidence by Lac, Corona would have acquired the lands that
Lac secured by the improper use of the ionfidential information.38 The
Court concluded that the most appropriate remedy in those circumstances
was to impose a constructive trust over the lands in favour of Corona. 39 In
CadburySchweppes, Binnie J. stated:
The result of Lac Minerals is to confirm jurisdiction in the courts in a
breach of confidence action to grant a remedy dictated by the facts of
the case rather than strict jurisdictional or doctrinal considerations. See
J.D. Davies, "Duties of Confidence and Loyalty", [1990] Lloyd's Mar.
& Com. L.Q. 4, at p. 5:
There is much to be said for the majority view [in Lac Minerals
Ltd.] that, if a ground of liability is established, then the remedy
that follows should be the one that is most appropriate on the
facts of the case rather than one derived from history or overcategorization. °
Similarly, in Murphy, Nation J. concluded that it was likely that but for

the misuse of confidential information by Predator, Murphy would have
acquired the leases in question, and on this basis she concluded that the

4
most appropriate remedy in the circumstances was a constructive trust. '

She stated:
Generally, the cases about the misuse of confidential information, and
breach of confidence, establish that if the wrongdoer acquires actual

property that would otherwise have been acquired by the plaintiff, an
in rem remedy such as a constructive trust may well be suited to right
the wrong, especially if it directs the title of the property to the party in
whose name it would have been "but for" the breach.42

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Supra note 8 at paras. 121 & 198.
Ibid.
Supra note 6 at para. 24.
Supra note 26 at paras. 115 & 122.
bid. atpara. 121.
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Thus, with respect- to crafting an appropriate remedy for a breach of
confidence, courts will be free to consider all the circumstances and craft
a remedy that fits those circumstances.
3. Breach offiduciary duty
Traditionally, courts have found a party to be under a fiduciary obligation
only where the relationship was one that fell into a closed category of
relationships, such as principal/agent, trustee/beneficiary, or solicitor/
43
client. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen
suggested that the categories of fiduciary relationships should not be
closed in all cases. This was expanded upon in Framev. Smith,44 where the
Supreme Court of Canada set out a test for determining when a relationship
would be considered to be fiduciary in nature. Madam Justice Wilson
(dissenting on other. grounds) articulated a three-part test:
1. The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power;
2.

The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as
to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and

3. The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the
45
fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

Madam Justice Wilson also reiterated that, generally speaking, commercial
dealings at arm's length would not create fiduciary obligations:
Because of the requirement of vulnerability of the beneficiary at the
hands of the fiduciary, fiduciary obligations are seldom present in the
dealings ofexperienced businessmen of'similar bargaining strength acting
at arms-length ... The law takes the position that such individuals are
perfectly capable of agreeing as to the scope of the discretion or power to
be exercised, i.e., any "vulnerability" could have been prevented through
the more prudent exercise of their bargaining power and the remedies
for the wrongful exercise or abuse of that discretion or power, namely
damages, are adequate in such a case.4
In Lac Minerals, the Supreme Court of Canada again considered whether or
not a fiduciary duty existed between two arm's-length commercial parties,
where a senior mining company used confidential information provided
by a junior mining company in the context of joint venture negotiations in

43. [1984] 2 S.C.R 335 [Guerin].
44.
45.
46.

[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 [Frame].
Ibid. at para. 60.
Ibid. at para. 63.
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order to acquire a mining lease for its own benefit to the exclusion of the
junior. In an awkwardly split decision, three of the five judges concluded
that no fiduciary duty existed, but that the senior mining company had a
duty of confidence in dealing with the information provided by the junior,
47
and that it breached that duty.
In Cadbury Schweppes, the Supreme Court again considered whether
fiduciary obligations were owed by one contractual party to another in
an arm's-length commercial situation. The Court again reinforced its
view, as articulated in Frameand Lac Minerals, that the policy objectives
underlying fiduciary obligations should not generally apply to sophisticated
4
business entities dealing with each other at arms-length. 1
Based upon the Frame, Lac Minerals, and Cadbury Schweppes
trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada decisions, it now seems clear that, at
least where two sophisticated commercial entities are dealing with each
other at arm's-length, it will only be in extraordinary circumstances that
a fiduciary duty is owed by one to the other. Thus, where seismic data
is shared between parties in an arm's-length commercial context, the
relationship will, in most circumstances, not attract fiduciary obligations.
This part of the paper has focused on the two main legal mechanisms
to protect confidential seismic data from improper use or disclosure:
contractual provisions and the common law duty of confidence. We first
examined some of the provisions commonly encountered in contractual
arrangements for the protection of confidential seismic data. We then
examined the elements of the common law duty of confidentiality, and how
this doctrine has developed in recent years. We also briefly touched upon
the law of fiduciary duty and noted its apparent declining importance with
respect to addressing misuse of confidential information. In the next part
of this paper, we will examine the statutory regime governing the CanadaNewfoundland Offshore Board and the Canada Nova Scotia Offshore
Board as it affects the balance between the private rights of the producers/
owners of seismic data and the public responsibility to encourage the
development of Canada's natural resources.
4. Statute - east coast
In the continental shelf off the east coast of Canada, s. 119(2) of the
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act 49 and s.
122(2) of the Canada-NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord

47.
48.
49.

Supranote8atparas.38& 111.
Supra note 6 at para. 30.
S.C. 1987, c. 3, as amended [NewfoundlandAccord Act].
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Implementation Act,50 respectively, afford strong protection for the
confidentiality of seismic data. The Nova Scotia section is as follows:
122(2) Subject to section 19 and this section, information or
documentation provided for the purposes of this Part or Part II or any
regulation made under either Part, whether or not such information
or documentation is required to be provided under either Part or any
regulation made thereunder, is privileged and shall not knowingly be
disclosed without the consent in writing of the person who provided it
except for the purposes of the administration or enforcement ofeither Part
or for the purposes of legal proceedings relating to such administration
or enforcement.
Section 19 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (s. 18 in the Newfoundland
Accord Act) allows the federal and provincial ministers access to any
5
information which the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board '
has:
19(1) The federal Minister and the Provincial Minister are entitled
to access to any information or documentation relating to petroleum
resource activities in the offshore area that is provided for the purposes
of this Act or any regulation made thereunder and such information or
documentation shall, on the request of either Minister, be disclosed to
that Minister without requiring the consent of the party who provided
the information or documentation.
19(2) Section 122 applies, with such modifications as the circumstances
require, in respect of any disclosure of information or documentation or
the production or giving of evidence relating thereto by a Minister as if
the references in that section to the administration or enforcement of a
Part of this Act included references to the administration or enforcement
of the Provincial Act or any Part thereof.
Section 122(5) of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (s. 119(5) in the
Newfoundland Accord Act) provides an exception to the privilege and
non-disclosure obligations set out in Section 122(2):
122(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to the following classes of
information or documentation obtained as a result of carrying on a
work or activity that is authorized under Part HI, namely, information or
documentation in respect of

50. S.C. 1988, c. 28, as amended [Nova Scotia AccordAct].
51. Hereinafter, the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board is referred to as the "CanadaNova Scotia Board," and the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board is referred to as the
"Canada-Newfoundland Board," and collectively, they are referred to as the "Boards."
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(a)

an exploratory well, where the information or documentation is
obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if two years have
passed since the well termination date of that well;

(b)

a delineation well, where the information or documentation is
obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if the later of
(i) two years since the well termination date of the relevant
exploratory well, and
(ii) ninety days since the well termination date of the delineation
well, have passed;

(c)

a development well, where the.information or documentation is
obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if the later of
(i) two years since the well termination date of the relevant
exploration well, and
(ii) sixty days since the well termination date of the development
well, have passed;

(d)

geological work or geophysical work performed on or in relation
to any portion of the offshore area,
(i) in the case of a well site seabed survey where the well has
been drilled, after the expiration of the period referred to in
paragraph (a) or the later period referred to in subparagraph
(b)(i) or (ii) or (c)(i) or (ii), according to whether paragraph
(a), (b) or (c) is applicable in respect of that well, or
(ii) in any other case, after the expiration of five years following
the date of completion of the work;

(e)

any engineering research or feasibility study or experimental
project, including geotechnical work, carried out on or in relation
to any portion of the offshore area,
(i) where it relates to a well and the well has been drilled, after
the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (a) or
the later period referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii) or
(c) (i) or (ii), according to whether paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is
applicable in respect of that well, or
(ii) in any other case, after the expiration of five years following
the date of completion of the research, study or project or after
the reversion of that portion of the offshore area to Crown
reserve areas, whichever occurs first;

(f)

any contingency plan formulated in respect of emergencies arising
as a result of any work or activity authorized under Part HI;
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(g)
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diving work, weather observation or the status of operational
activities or of the development of or production from a pool or
field;

(g. 1) accidents, incidents or petroleum spills, to the extent necessary to
permit a person or body to produce and to distribute or publish a
report for the administration of this Act in respect of the accident,
incident or spill;
(h)

any study funded from an account established under subsection
76(1) of the CanadaPetrolewn Resources Act, if the study has
been completed; and

(i)

an environmental study, other than a study referred to in paragraph
(h),
(i) where it relates to a well and the well has been drilled, after
the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (a) or
the later period referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii) or
(c) (i) or (ii), according to whether paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is
applicable in respect of that well, or
(ii) in any other case, if five years have passed since the
completion of the study.

In summary, s. 122(2) protects all information and documentation submitted
to the Nova Scotia Board pursuant to Parts II and III of the AccordActs
from disclosure. It provides that seismic data, seismic reports, well data,
well reports, and other information provided to the Board pursuant to Parts
II or III of the Nova ScotiaAccord Act or regulations made thereunder "is
privileged and shall not knowingly be disclosed" by the Board (or under

s. 19 by either the provincial or federal Minister), without the consent of
the provider of the information.
Section 122(5) limits the s. 122(2) protection. It provides that s.
122(2) does not apply to certain classes of information obtained as a

result of carrying on an activity authorized under Part III of the Act after
certain specified time periods have expired. Accordingly, when the Nova
Scotia Board grants a work authorization to do work that results in the
accumulation of data, it frequently includes a condition that certain data
and other information required thereunder may be disclosed after the
expiry of the relevant hold periods.
Section 122(2) of the Nova Scotia Accord Act and Section 119(2) of
the Newfoundland Accord Act impose two restrictive terms on which the
respective Boards must hold information provided to them pursuant to
Parts II or III of the respective Accord Acts. The first restrictive term is
that the information is privileged. "Privilege" is a term of art operating in
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the litigation context. A party cannot be compelled to produce privileged
information in the course of legal proceedings. Privilege from disclosure
in litigation is usually granted if, and only if, the four conditions enunciated
in Wigmore on Evidence are satisfied:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for
2
the correct disposal of litigation.1

The second restriction under s. 122(2) is that the information may not
be disclosed. This non-disclosure obligation is general in nature and
goes beyond the privilege obligation, which applies only in the litigation
context. Under s. 122(5) both the privilege and non-disclosure obligations
of the Board become inapplicable to specified information after specified
periods of time.
The effect of s. 119(5) of the NewfoundlandAccordAct was discussed
in Geophysical Service Inc. v. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board,53 where Gibson J. concluded that:
I am satisfied that it is beyond doubt that the seismic data provided by
the Applicant to the Canada-Newfoundland Board was information or
documentation provided for the purposes of Part II or Part 111 and thus
fell within the ambit of the privilege provided by subsection 119(2) of
the [Newfoundland Accord] Act. I am equally satisfied that, by virtue
of paragraph 119(5)(d), and in particular subparagraph (ii) of paragraph
(d), that privilege expired five (5) years following the date of completion
of the seismic work to which the information or documentation related.
Thus, on the expiration of that five (5) year period, it was entirely
open to the Canada-Newfoundland Board to make such information or
documentation available to a requester.5 4
The issue in GSI was whether the Canada-Nova Scotia Board, the
Canada-Newfoundland Board and the National Energy Board were able to

52. See e.g. Re Inquiry Into the Confidentialityof Health Records in Ontario (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d)
704 at para. 33; rev'd on other grounds [1981] 2 S.C.R. 494.
±
53. 2003 FCT 507, 26 C.P.R. (4 ) 1990 [GSI].
54. Ibid. at para. 75.
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withhold from a requestor the identity of organizations that had previously
sought access to geophysical information under the Access to Information
Act." Accordingly, while the above statement by Gibson J. supports the
proposition that ss. 122(2) and (5) of the Nova ScotiaAccord Act, and ss.
119(2) and (5) of the NewfoundlandAccordAct allow the Board to disclose
information after the expiry of the privilege period, that conclusion was
not central to the case and the decision did not expressly address the effect
on the Canada-Nova Scotia Board's disclosure rights of: (i) copyright; (ii)
the law of confidential information; (iii) the Access to Information Act;56
or (iv) the Freedom ofInformation andProtectionof PrivacyAct.57
The practice of making available natural resource exploration and
production data and other information after statutory hold periods is
common in most Canadian jurisdictions." The natural resource industry,
and the oil and gas sector in particular, have been submitting exploration
and other data to regulators for decades in the knowledge that it may be
disclosed in accordance with applicable legislation.
The Board has followed the practice of disclosing hard copies of
seismic data collected on paper tape (hereinafter referred to as Hard Copy
Data) after the applicable hold periods, which reflects the first objective of
the Canada-NovaScotia Offshore PetroleumResourcesAccord: to achieve
the early development Of petroleum resources in the offshore area.
From a policy perspective, there is clearly a balance of interests to
be struck between the provider of data, which wants to reap the fullest
private reward from its expertise, cost and effort in producing the
data, and the governments of Canada, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
and Labrador, which want to encourage exploration of the offshore
resource. That balance has been addressed statutorily by s. 122 of the
Nova Scotia Accord Act, which gives the provider of the data certain
peiiods of exclusivity during which that provider may take the absolute
benefit of the information in whatever manner it chooses, but purports
to relax that exclusivity thereafter. Some legislation that provides for the
disclosure of seismic data does so more clearly than Section 122(5) by
expressly permitting or mandating the disclosure of seismic data to any
person requesting such disclosure after the expiry of the relevant hold
period. Section 50(1) and (3)(d) of the predecessor to the current accord

55. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-I, as amended [ATIA].
56. Ibid.
57. S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, as amended [FOIPOP].
58. See infra note 67.

536

The Dalhousie Law Journal

implementation legislation-the Canada Oil and Gas Act5 9-is an example
of legislation that permits such disclosure:
50. (1) Information or documentation furnished under this Act or the
Oil and Gas Productionand ConservationAct is privileged and shall not
knowingly be disclosed without the consent in writing of the party who.
provided it except for the purposes of the administration or enforcement
of either Act or for the purposes of legal proceedings relating to such
administration or enforcement.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), information or documentation
furnished in respect of the following matters may be disclosed, in the
manner prescribed as follows:
(d) in respect of geological or geophysical work performed on or in
relation to Canada lands, on the expiration of five years following the
completion of the work or on the reversion of the lands to Crown reserve
lands, whichever first occurs;
Section 50 of the Canada Oil and Gas Act is very much like s. 122(2)
of the Nova Scotia Accord Act. The wording of s. 50(3), however, is
different in that it expressly permits the disclosure of information. Section
122(5), on the other hand, simply provides that the privilege and nondisclosure requirements of Section 122(2) no longer apply after the hold
period expires. By not expressly permitting the disclosure of information
after the hold periods, the current legislation leaves open the applicability
of copyright protection and the common law protection of confidential
information to seismic data held by the Boards pursuant to Sections 119(2)
and 122(2) respectively.
We turn, accordingly, to a consideration of the extent to which
copyright and the common law protection of confidential information
affect the disclosure provisions of s. 122. Then we discuss the impact of
access to information and protection of privacy legislation on government's
authority to disclose seismic information.
a. Breach of copyright
Under the Copyright Act, 6° copyright subsists in all original literary,
dramatic, musical, and artistic work. Copyright protection, however, does
not extend to data, ideas, or facts, but is limited to the expression thereof.
To qualify as an original work, there must be some exercise of skill and

59.
60.

S.C. 1981, c. 1.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
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judgment on the part of the author of the work. Therefore, raw data or
information is not subject to protection, although a compilation of data or
a report may be.6'
The existence of copyright in processed, reprocessed, and finally
processed seismic data must be determined in each case on its own
merits. An argument may be made that the processing and reprocessing
of the seismic data involves the application of skill and judgment in such
manner as to attract copyright protection. Just running the data through
a processing program will not convert the raw data into a copyrightable
Work. If, however, judgment is exercised in the selection of program
variables, based perhaps on reviewing the effect of different processing
techniques on certain portions of the data, then this process may constitute
a sufficient application of skill and judgment to attract copyright.
With respect to information other than raw data, s. 25 of the Canada62
Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Geophysical Operations Regulations
requires every operator to file a report within twelve months of the
termination of a geophysical operation. The report contains a variety
of documents including descriptions, summaries, maps, studies, and
interpretations. To the extent that these documents require the use of skill
and judgment in the analysis, organization, and compilation of data, they
are protected and their disclosure would likely constitute a violation of the
CopyrightAct.
That portion of the information and documentation which does not
constitute raw data may not, under copyright law therefore, be viewed
by or disclosed to members of the public, as such viewing or disclosure
would constitute publication prohibited under copyright law, unless s.
122(5) prevails in the manner suggested by Gibson J. in GSI, or unless the
provider of the information has consented to such viewing or disclosure.
An argument could be made that the long-term practice of Boards to
disclose certain seismic data (e.g. Hard Copy Data) after the hold periods
constitutes implied consent by the submitters to the disclosure of such data.
This argument is somewhat strengthened when the Boards add a covering
letter enclosing the work authorizations specifying that the information
will be disclosed after those certain time periods. The implied consent
argument is somewhat less persuasive in respect of forms of seismic
data which the Boards have not traditionally disclosed and which are not

61. CCH CanadianLtd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339.
62. N.S. Reg. 191/95, s. 25.
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specifically described as being subject to release in cover letters enclosing
work authorizations.
b. Breach of confidence
As discussed above, in order to prove an action for breach of confidence,
all three of the following tests must be met:
1.

The information conveyed was confidential, i.e., having a quality of
confidence about it;

2.

The information was communicated in confidence, i.e., in circumstances
in which it is reasonable to conclude that the information was imparted in
confidence. No contract between the parties is necessary.

3.

The information was misused or used in an unauthorized manner by the
party to whom it was communicated. 3

We examine these three elements in this statutory context where disclosure
to the Boards constitutes a statutorily mandated disclosure.
Focusing on the first part of the test will help determine what will be
considered "confidential information." In Lac Minerals, the Court cites
Lord Greene in Saltman EngineeringCo. v. Campbell EngineeringCo.:
The information, to be confidential, must ... apart from contract, have
the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be
something which is public property and public knowledge. On the other

hand, it is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a
formula, a plan, a sketch, or something of that kind, which is the result of

work done by the maker upon materials which may be available for the
use of anybody; but what makes it confidential is the fact that the maker
of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can
only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process.'
Therefore, there are two types of confidential information. The first
type includes information which is not public property and not public
knowledge, and the second type includes information which is essentially
work product, having a value-added component as a result of the process
of the maker assembling the information into the work product.
The Pharand-Ski Corp. test, discussed above, sets out the several
factors which should be considered when determining whether information

63. Supra note 8 at para. 129.
64. Ibid. at para. 58, citing (1948), 65 R.P.C. 203, [1963] 3 All E.R. 413n (C.A.).
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has a confidential quality about it.65 A review of these factors leads to
the conclusion that the information provided to the Boards pursuant to
Parts II and III of the Accord Acts, particularly the seismic information,
is confidential information. Factors 3 through 6 listed above offer the
strongest support that this type of information is confidential. It is a
well known industry practice that the owners of seismic information
take substantial measures to safeguard their information. As well, the
information is valuable to competitors. This information could not easily
be duplicated by others since this would require a work authorization and
licence for that particular area. The first element to prove a breach of
confidence would, therefore, likely be met.
The second element of the test is whether the information was
communicated in confidence. The standard to be used is the "reasonable
person test"; that is whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would have concluded that the information was being imparted to the
Board in confidence. This will be a question of fact. For example, in Coco,
the Court stated: "However secret and confidential the information, there
can be no binding obligation of confidence for information that is blurted
out in public or is communicated in other circumstances which negative a
duty of holding it confidential."6 6
In addition to the Offshore Boards' practices, many Canadian laws
in many Canadian jurisdictions provide for the disclosure of exploration
information by government agencies under certain conditions, usually
67
specified time periods or upon the authorization of the government.
As stated by Mungo Hardwicke-Brown:
Confidential information can enter the public domain in three ways:
(1)..

(2) disclosure pursuant to applicable law;

65. See Pharand,supranote 20 at 246. 1) The extent to which the information is known outside the
owner's business; 2) The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the owner's
business; 3) The extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; 4) The value
of the information to him and his competitors; 5) The amount of money or effort expended by him in
developing the information; 6) The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others (i.e., by their independent endeavours).
66. Supra note 23 at 47-48.
67. These laws include Nova Scotia s Petroleum Resources Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 342, as amended;
MineralResources Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 18, as amended; PrinceEdwardIsland's Oil andNatural Gas
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. 0-5; British Columbia's Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
361; Alberta ' Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, Alta. Reg. 151/1971; Newfoundland Accord
Act, supranote 49; CanadaPetroleumResources Act, R.S.C. 1985 ( 2 *d Supp.), c. 36.
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(3)

....

In the context of oil and gas exploration and development, information
that is in the public domain includes information released by the Alberta
Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) pursuant to the Oil and Gas
ConservationRegulations.68

To the extent, then, that the Offshore Boards have lawfully disclosed
seismic information, the quality of confidentiality in that information is
lost.
The Boards are, within the scope of offshore accord legislation, the
regulators of the resource on behalf of the owner of the resource. The
rules for participating in the exploration and development of that resource
are set out in the AccordActs, and one of the conditions to which industry
submits in order to participate in that resource is the partial relinquishment
of the privilege and non-disclosure protections of s. 122(2) (Nova
Scotia) or s. 119(2) (Newfoundland and Labrador) pursuant to the hold
period expiration provisions of s. 122(5) (Nova Scotia) and s. 119(5)
(Newfoundland and Labrador).
Moreoever, the "Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board
Geophysical and Geological Programs in the Nova Scotia Offshore Area
Guidelines for Work Programs, Authorizations & Reports" created in
1992, and mirrored in the Newfoundland and Labrador context, states
under section 9 entitled "Confidentiality":
Exclusive geophysical and geological reports, maps, data and other
materials are kept confidential for 5 1/2 years after termination of the
field work.
Non-Exclusive or Speculative geophysical data, reports and maps will
be kept confidential for at least ten years from the completion of the
field work.
For site survey information, the geological and geophysical data, report
and materials will be kept confidential for the same period of time as
information for the well over which the site investigation was conducted.
Where a well is not drilled, the period of confidentiality for the report
and data will be five and one-half years from the date of completion of
the field work.
Reports and data are made available to the public at the termination of
relevant confidentiality periods.
During the confidentiality period, the Chief Conservation Officer may

68. Hardwicke-Brown, supra note 12 at 370.
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inform other operators in the area if a relevant hazard is detected by a

site survey. 69

The Guidelines were created to clarify and standardize the program
authorization and reporting requirements for geological and geophysical
exploratory work and seabed surveys conducted in offshore Nova Scotia.
The Board's practice has been to disclose Hard Copy Data after the expiry
of the hold periods set out in the Guidelines.
In certain instances (and it is, we understand, now the standard
practice), the Geophysical/Geological Work Authorizations granted by the
Nova Scotia Board contain a condition similar to the following:
Exclusive geophysical and geological reports, maps and data and other
materials will be kept confidential for five and one half years after
termination of the field work. Non-exclusive or speculative geophysical
and geological data, reports and maps will be kept confidential for at
least ten years from the completion of the field work. Hard copy of
data, report and maps will be made available for public disclosure at the

termination of the relevant confidentiality periods.
The Offshore Boards' policy on disclosure of Hard Copy Data after
the expiry of the relevant hold period is well-known to those participating
in the offshore oil and gas industry. Clearly, there is an expectation
of confidentiality during the relevant hold period. However, after the
expiration of such hold period, there can be no reasonable expectation of
confidentiality with respect to Hard Copy Data because of the Boards'.longstanding practice, and the express indication in the cover letter enclosing
the work authorization that such data will be disclosed after the expiry of
the relevant hold period. Thus, in these circumstances, the second element
of the test for breach of confidence would likely not be met.
The third element of the test for breach of confidence is whether the
information is misused. As noted above, any use that is not a permitted
use is prohibited and amounts to a breach of the duty of confidentiality.7"
Given the conclusion above as to the second element of the test in
respect of Hard Copy Data, it is not necessary to explore the third element

69. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, "Geophysical and Geological Programs in the
Nova Scotia Offshore Area Guidelines for Work Programs, Authorizations & Reports" (1992) at s. 9
[Guidelines].
70. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
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of the test. Accordingly, the disclosure by the Boards of Hard Copy Data
after the hold periods will likely not constitute a breach of confidence. 7
c. Access to Information Act
The Access to InformationAct (ATIA) applies to "government institutions"
as set out in s. 4:
4. (1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of
Parliament, every person who is
(a) a Canadian citizen, or
(b) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct,
has a right to and shall, on request, be given access
to any record
72
under the control of a government institution.
Government institutions are those bodies included in Schedule I to the
ATIA. Schedule I includes the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum
Board. Therefore the ATIA applies generally to these Boards.
The purpose of the ATIA is set forth in s. 2:
2. (1) The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to
provide a right of access to information in records under the control of a
government institution in accordance with the principles that government
information should be available to the public, that necessary exceptions
to the right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions
on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed
independently of government.
(2) This Act is intended to complement and not replace. existing
procedures for access to government information and is not intended
to limit in any way access to the type of government information that is
normally available to the general public.
It is important to note that s. 2(2) is clear that the intent of the ATIA is
not to define the sole parameters through which a government institution

71. Trade secrets are sometimes discussed in the context of confidentiality of information. The
term "trade secret" has two general meanings. One is as a synonym for confidential or proprietary
information, in which case the analysis herein applies equally to trade secrets as to confidential
information. The other meaning of trade secret is a reference to confidential plans, processes, tools,
mechanisms or formulae. We do not think any information or documentation provided under Part II
or III of the Offshore Accord Acts constitutes a trade secret within that second meaning.
72. Supra note 55.
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can disclose information. On the contrary, it is to complement other
mechanisms for the disclosure of information.
The ATIA also contains the following provision:
24. (1) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any
record requested under this Act that contains information the disclosure
of which is restricted by or pursuant to any provision set out in Schedule
II.
Schedule II includes, among other references, references to ss. 19 and 122
of the Nova Scotia AccordAct and to s. 119 (but oddly not to s. 18) of the
Newfoundland Accord Act. The effect of s. 24 of the ATIA is to render any
information that is inaccessible under ss. 19 and 122 of the Nova Scotia
Accord Act or s. 119 of the Newfoundland Accord Act inaccessible under
the ATIA. Section 24 therefore reinforces the privilege and non-disclosure
provisions of s. 119(2) (NewfoundlandAccord Act) and s. 122(2) (Nova
Scotia AccordAct), but has no application after the expiry of the s. 122(5)
and s. 119(5) time periods.
Section 20 oftheATIA makes it mandatory for the head ofa government
institution to refuse to disclose certain classes of information when they
are requested under the ATIA:
20. (1) Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall
refuse to disclose any record requestedunder this Act that contains
(a) trade secrets of a third party;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information
that is confidential information supplied to a government
institution by a third party and is treated consistently in a
confidential manner by the third party; ...
(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to result in material financial loss or gain to, or
could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive
position of, a third party; or
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of
a third party. 3
The purpose of the ATIA is to add an additional avenue for access to
government information for those circumstances where-absent the ATIAthere might not be any right of access. If the ATM were the only avenue to
73.
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gain access to seismic data, then s. 20(1) would act to bar that disclosure
to the extent that it fell into one of the categories set out therein. However,
s. 20(1) does not create a free-standing obligation to keep information
confidential in a context other than an application for access to information
under the ATIA.
The ATIA is not required to gain access to Hard Copy Data as the
Board regularly discloses such information after the expiry of the relevant
hold periods, and s. 20(1) would not apply to restrict disclosure of such
data. With respect to Digitil Data, an application could be made under the
ATIA for access to such information after the expiry of the relevant hold
periods because this data is not usually disclosed by the Boards. In these
circumstances, the Boards may look to s. 20(1) and refuse to grant access
to such Digital Data on one of the grounds set therein.
d. Freedom of Information and Protectionof PrivacyLegislation
Some proponents of more severe restrictions on government disclosure of
seismic data may seek to rely not only on the ATIA, but also on provincial
freedom of information legislation in support of their position.
74
The Freedom oflnformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct (FOIPOP)
sets out its application in s. 4:
4 (1)This Act applies to all records in the custody or under the control of
a public body, including court administration records.
Whether an organization is a public body depends upon the definition of
"public body" in s. 3(1) of FOIPOP:
j)

"public body" means
(i) a Government department or a board, commission, foundation,
agency, tribunal, association or other body of persons, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, all the members of which or all
the members of the board of management or board of directors of
which
(A) are appointed by order of the Governor in Council, or
(B) if not so appointed, in the discharge of their duties are public
officers or servants of the Crown,
and includes, for greater certainty, each body referred to in the
Schedule to this Act .... 75
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The Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board is not listed in the Schedule
to FOIPOP. Whether this Board is a public body for the purposes of
FOIPOP, therefore, depends upon the constitution of the Board and
whether it fits within the above definition of "public body."
The Board is appointed in the manner contemplated in s. 10 of the
Nova ScotiaAccordAct. This section provides that the Board is comprised
of five persons, including the four "regular members," two of whom are
appointed by either the federal or provincial governments. They may be
jointly appointed by the provincial and the federal governments under s.
10(4), but this has not been the practice. It is our conclusion that all
the members of the Board are not necessarily appointed by order of the
Governor in Council (though that may be possible under s. 10(4)).
Under s. 11(2) of the FOIPOP not more than two members of the
Board may be public servants and not more than one may be appointed by
each government. The members of the Board, therefore, are independent
of both governments (in accord with s. 2.02 of the Canada-NovaScotia
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord), do not carry out their functions
as public officers or servants of the Provincial Crown, and, in fact, two of
-them cannot be public servants in either government.
Consequently, the Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board does not
fit within the definition of "public body" and FOIPOPis not applicable
to it.
III. Conclusion
There are conflicting values which the confidentiality and disclosure
provisions of the Offshore Accord legislation try to balance. Industry
promotes the confidentiality of seismic data as a normal right of
ownership. Industry supports the position that non-consensual disclosure
will discourage seismic work and thus diminish knowledge of and interest
in (and ultimately the exploration of) the offshore area. Governments, on
the other hand, as owners of the resource which is the subject of seismic
exploration, want to enhance the value of their resource by disseminating
information about its hydrocarbon potential.
If the level of discontent of the government in the confidentiality
provisions is approximately equal to the level of discontent of industry in
the disclosure provisions, one might assume that the balance struck by the
legislation is not an unreasonable one, though an amendment to clarify the
relationship between the provisions of the Offshore Accord legislation, the
CopyrightAct and the common law of confidentiality would be helpful.
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Finally, it is submitted that federal access to information legislation
and provincial privacy legislation are a bit of a red herring:
1. The Access to Information Act only applies to requests made
under that act and does not attempt to alter any information release/
confidentiality provisions of any other act. It does not, therefore, interfere
with the privilege and disclosure provisions of s. 122 of the Nova Scotia
AccordAct or s. 119 of the Newfoundland Accord Act.
2. The Freedom of Information and Protection of PrivacyAct does
not apply because the Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board is not a
"public body" thereunder.
IV. Addendum: Update on digitaldata disclosure
Technological advances in collecting, storing and using the seismic data
have created an issue beyond the scope of this paper. Digital seismic data
is considerably more easily manipulated and considerably more valuable
than Hard Copy Data and the issue is the extent to which this altered state
of the data may modify the discussions and conclusions presented above.
Industry andthe regulators are in the midst of negotiations. The Nova
Scotia Offshore Board has asked industry, other government agencies
and research institution representatives for comment on the appropriate
parameters of disclosure of digital data. That input has been received; it
includes the following three-part proposal from the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers (C.A.P.P.):
1. Industry would grant a free licence to the regulators for the
unrestricted internal use of digital processed data in connection with
their resource management activities. This data would remain copyright
protected and disclosure to third parties would be prohibited.
2. Industry would make "paper equivalent" electronic documents
available through free, limited use licences to allow the Board to disclose
such information after the expiry of the privilege and non-disclosure
periods set out in section 122.
3. Bona fide, not-for-profit research and educational institutions
which sign appropriate confidentiality agreements would be able to obtain
free data licences from the data owner.
While the C.A.P.P. proposal appears to represent a workable middle
ground, no resolution has been reached as of April 2008.

